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In contemporary France, does social origin still have an in-
fluence when young men and women leave the educational 
system upon receiving their degree and present themselves 
on the labor market for their first job? If, even in a post-in-
dustrial society (Bell, 1973), family background still affects 
the degree of success of this first step among youths with 
the same educational assets, does this ascription effect 
endure over the course of their subsequent occupational 
careers? Could it be the case that, in a country characte-
rized by tremendous educational expansion over recent 
decades, the long-lasting effect of social origin has become 
more prominent in the most recent cohorts as compared 
to the previous ones? Finally, have returns to education fol-
lowed an opposite trend, thereby reflecting a recent shift in 
the relative balance between ascription and achievement? 
These questions are of central interest for both the study 
of French society and the more general understanding of 
fundamental social stratification processes that govern the 
dynamics of occupational attainment over the life course. 
Such issues are indeed sharply debated in current sociology. 
In particular, the ‘Increased Merit Selection’ hypothesis – as 
labeled by Jonsson (1993) – has suggested that, in modern 
societies, “access to education becomes decreasingly deter-
mined by class origin and that class position is increasingly 
dependent on educational achievement, as the influence of 
characteristics associated with family background becomes 
irrelevant” (Whelan and Layte, 2002: 38). If so, labor mar-
ket success in modern societies would increasingly depend 
on ‘merit’ as embodied in own educational achievement. 
However, other scholars have suggested that social back-
ground might well become increasingly relevant, especial-
ly as a consequence of the development of job positions 
within the tertiary sector for which employers attach im-
portance to “attributes that, rather than being achieved 
through ability and effort displayed within the educational 
system, are acquired more or less as a matter of course 
through family or community socialisation” (Jackson, Gold-
thorpe and Mills, 2005: 13). 
This chapter aims at conducting an empirical examination 
of the aforementioned questions on the basis of large scale, 
high quality and nationally representative data that spans 
the evolution of French society from 1977 to 2003 and the 
labor market situation of cohorts born between 1938 and 
1975. We begin by reviewing the literature that has exa-
mined trends in social stratification and mobility in France. 
In so doing, we will pay special attention to the empirical 
studies that, adopting a period perspective, have analyzed 
the gross Origin-Destination (OD) association, the ‘direct’ 
(i.e. net of Education), Origin-Destination association and, 
more generally, the so-called Origin-Education-Destination 
(OED) ‘triangle’. We will also review the French literature 
that, over the last two decades, has adopted a cohort pers-
pective to investigate change in the labor market returns to 
education and social origin across cohorts that have been 
differentially affected by educational expansion. Then we 
will present our material – the four Formation & Qualifi-
cation Professionnelle (FQP) surveys conducted in 1977, 
1985, 1993 and 2003 – as well as the definition of our 
dependent and explanatory variables, and the method of 
analysis. The third section will be devoted to a systematic 
overview of our empirical answers to the four fundamen-
tal research questions that we address: (i) the existence 
or non-existence of a ‘direct’ effect of class origin on labor 
market success; (ii) whether or not this effect varies in its 
intensity over educational categories; (iii) whether or not it 
has declined over time; (iv) whether or not returns to edu-
cation have decreased. Our contribution will answer these 
questions for France, not only on the basis of the central de-
pendent variables put forward in the comparative project 
– two continuous measures of labor market success based 
on a socioeconomic or occupational prestige score on one 
hand, current wage on the other hand –, but also by using 
two qualitative variables that more directly reflect the class 
position attained, namely getting access to the service class 
and ‘avoiding’ the working class. We will conclude with a 
final discussion of our results, putting them in perspective 
with both previous research about French society and the 
general theses that have been advanced in social stratifica-
tion research. 
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Origin-Destination and Origin-Education-Destina-
tion dynamics in French society: A review of the 
literature 
In a well-acclaimed book published more than thirty years 
ago, Thélot (1982: 148-9) provided a convincing test of 
whether or not, for all occupied men aged between 35 and 
52 in 1970, class origin still exerts a long-lasting and ‘direct’ 
effect on their current class position. To be more precise, 
the author postulated a specific model of class attainment 
in which class position at the entrance on the labor market 
depends on both education attained and class origin, and 
class position in 1970 depends on both education attained 
and first class position. That is to say, in such a model, all the 
influence of class background on current class destination is 
‘indirect’, as it only goes through its effects on educational 
attainment and first footsteps in the labor market. Estima-
ting the father-son mobility table that should have been ob-
served if such a theoretical model would have been valid, 
Thélot concluded that it clearly diverged from the real 1970 
mobility table in two ways: the model systematically unde-
restimates class immobility in all diagonal cells of the mo-
bility table; on the other hand it strongly overestimates the 
proportion of men who, while originating in the non agri-
cultural employer or self-employed class, or in the higher 
or lower service class, have, in their mature age, descended 
into the working class. 
Thélot therefore concluded that the long-lasting effect of 
class origin over the entire occupational career is funda-
mentally twofold. It reinforces class immobility and also in-
hibits strong social demotion. Applying the same analytical 
strategy to the corresponding population of all occupied 
women aged between 35 and 52 in 1970, Vallet (1991: 304-
11) subsequently demonstrated that the same conclusions 
also hold for women, albeit with an interesting nuance. The 
deviations between the real father-daughter table and the 
one implied by the theoretical model are weaker among fe-
males than they are among males, suggesting that, in the 
1970s French society, education attained and class position 
at the entrance on the labor market were more powerful 
determinants of female subsequent occupational trajecto-
ries, and/or pointing to the fact that, in the absence of mo-
ther’s  class position that was not documented in the 1970 
FQP survey, father’s class position might possibly synthesize 
the whole class background less accurately for women than 
for men. 
While the above analyses specifically addressed the issue of 
the existence of a long-term effect of class origin in French 
society, over and above its influence on obtained education 
and first occupational paths, a larger number of articles 
in journals or chapters in books have examined temporal 
trends in the gross Origin-Destination association, both in 
absolute and relative terms. Both Goldthorpe and Porto-
carero (1981) for the period 1953-1970, Thélot (1982) for 
1953-1977, then Vallet (1999) between 1953 and 1993, and 
recently Vallet (2014) between 1977 and 2003 have pointed 
to the same two-fold conclusion. Absolute rates of social 
mobility, i.e. observed mobility, have increased over the se-
cond half of the 20th century, especially as a consequence 
of the transformation from an agricultural to an industrial, 
then post-industrial society, but not only for such a ‘struc-
tural’ reason. That is to say, relative rates of social mobility, 
i.e. social fluidity, have also slightly and monotonically risen. 
Vallet (1999) estimated for instance that, for both French 
working men and women aged between 35 and 59, the 
strength of the statistical association between class origin 
and class destination – measured in the scale of logged odds 
ratios – has diminished over forty years at an annual rate of 
0.5%. It is notable that this diagnosis of slightly increasing 
openness in the French social structure has been extended 
to, and confirmed by, analyses of homogamy tables among 
married and cohabiting couples between 1969 and 2011, 
for both education, class destination and class origin (Bou-
chet-Valat, 2014). 
In his contribution to Social Mobility in Europe (Breen, 
2004), Vallet has scrutinized the causes of this increase in 
social fluidity, introducing education as an intermediate va-
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riable between origin and destination, i.e. analyzing the OED 
‘triangle’. According to his conclusions for both men and wo-
men, three elementary processes have intervened: an uneven 
decline in the inequality of educational opportunity (the Ori-
gin-Education association); a decline in the relative occupatio-
nal advantage afforded by education (the net Education-Des-
tination association); a compositional effect by which the 
expansion of education has progressively increased the relative 
size of educational categories for which the direct effect of ori-
gin on destination is reduced1. It is remarkable that, among the 
three sides of the OED ‘triangle’, the ‘direct’ OD side was found 
the most stable over the period 1970-93, a conclusion that 
also corroborated Goux and Maurin’s previous statement  that 
“there is no evidence of a decline of the OD net association” 
(1997: 173). 
While the aforementioned contributions have analyzed the 
dynamics of the relationships between class origin, education, 
and class destination in France following a period perspective, 
i.e. on the basis of surveys conducted in different years, other 
works have adopted the complementary view provided by a bir-
th cohort perspective (see, in particular, Baudelot and Establet, 
2000; Chauvel, 1998a). The latter author has emphasized that 
French men and women born between the late 1930s and the 
late 1940s have benefited from a clearly propitious context that 
no longer existed to the same extent for subsequent cohorts. 
They became more qualified than their elders as a consequence 
of the first French educational expansion (Chauvel, 1998b). Mo-
reover, they got high returns to their educational investments 
because of the rapid transformation of the French occupational 
structure, especially the increase of the tertiary sector and the 
multiplication of medium- and high-skilled corresponding jobs. 
More recently, using a series of five French Labor Force Surveys, 
1. This compositional effect has also been described for the 
United States (Hout, 1988). According to Vallet’s analyses, the 
capability of advanced education to weaken the ‘ascriptive’ ef-
fect has diminished over the course of the educational expan-
sion, thereby suggesting that a given tertiary degree, being less 
rare in 1993 than in 1970, might well represent a less strong 
signal, consequently becoming less powerful in offsetting the 
origins effect.
Peugny (2007) has scrutinized the social mobility experience of 
men and women belonging to birth cohorts that span half a cen-
tury (from 1924-28 for the oldest to 1974-78 for the youngest). 
Using a classification inspired by the Erikson, Goldthorpe and 
Portocarero class schema and computing the ratio of upward 
mobility to downward mobility, he confirmed that this statistic 
culminated for men and women born between 1939 and 1948, 
then regularly declined for subsequent cohorts. For instance, at 
the age of 35 to 39, the ratio amounted at 2.55 for men in the 
1944-48 cohort, but 1.63 in the 1964-68 one, and respectively 
1.68 and 1.20 for women. The declining trend in the ratio statis-
tic is partly related to a less rapid and less favorable evolution 
in the occupational and social structure during the recent de-
cades as opposed to the ‘Trente Glorieuses’ period, despite the 
fact that the cohorts born during the 1960s were remarkably 
more educated as a consequence of the second French edu-
cational expansion. Using linear multiple regression to analyze 
the determinants of a socio-economic status score for, separa-
tely, men and women in the 1941-50, 1949-58, and 1959-68 
cohorts, the author simultaneously highlights clear signs of 
declining occupational returns to education across cohorts, as 
well as an increasing net effect of the father’s socio-economic 
status score.
Data and Methods
To address our research questions, we use four surveys that 
belong to the Formation & Qualification Professionnelle (FQP) 
series and were conducted in 1977, 1985, 1993 and 2003 by the 
French Statistical Office (INSEE) in metropolitan France. These 
large-scale surveys (N=39,103 in 1977; 39,233 in 1985; 18,332 
in 1993; and 39,285 in 2003), with a highly comparable design 
and questionnaire, are usually considered as offering unique 
information about social background, educational career and 
qualifications, position on the labor market and detailed cha-
racteristics of occupation both in the first job and at the time of 
the survey (or last occupation for people unemployed or out of 
the labor force), as well as detailed information about wage in 
the year before the survey.
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We restrict our analytical sample to persons born in metro-
politan France in order to avoid fragile comparisons between 
immigrants and natives: educational career and first job of im-
migrants may often have taken place in another country where 
our categories do not apply; moreover, even when studying 
current job in France, a time-dependent effect might well be 
introduced as a consequence of the significant variations in im-
migration inflows, outflows and policies over the period. We 
also focus exclusively on people aged 28 to 65 in each survey, 
so that most respondents have completed their education and 
are not yet retired (or not for too long)2.
We model three different outcome variables with respect to 
both first and current job: occupational prestige score, acces-
sing the service class, and avoiding the working class. Occu-
pational prestige scores are taken from Chambaz, Maurin and 
Torelli (1998), and were obtained via a survey in which respon-
dents were asked to rate typical detailed occupations on a five-
grade scale. We use the scores computed for 16 occupational 
categories, ranging from -1.52 for unskilled workers to +2.19 for 
liberal professions.
Accessing the service class corresponds to membership in the 
Erikson, Goldthorpe and Portocarero (EGP) classes I and II. 
Avoiding the working class corresponds to belonging to another 
EGP class than classes IIIb, VI, VIIa and VIIb. Such a definition 
of the working class is therefore a broad one, as it includes not 
only blue-collar workers (both skilled and unskilled), but also 
agricultural workers and lower-grade routine non-manual wor-
kers. With regard to the current job, the most recent occupa-
tion is used for people who are unemployed or out of the labor 
market at the time of the survey.
Our fourth outcome variable is the logarithm of the net an-
2. The employment rate of men aged 60-64 in France dropped 
from 51.0% in 1975 to only 14.4% in 2003, then rose to 23.7% 
in 2012; the corresponding statistics for men aged 55-59 are 
80.3%, 60.0% and 71.0% (INSEE, 2013). Female employment 
rates are lower, but less variable over time. As a consequence, 
we emphasize the importance of considering the last occupa-
tion for all those who are not currently occupied. 
nual wage for salaried respondents who were employed full-
time during 12 months the year before the survey (1976, 1984, 
1992 or 2002); it is not available for the first job. Self-employed 
income is not taken into account since this information is not 
available for all survey years, and cannot be reliably compared 
with wages. Mandatory social security contributions (pension 
and health insurance) are not included in the value of the net 
wage. On the other hand, in the French system, income taxes 
are transferred to employees as part of the net wage, and paid 
directly later by tax payers. The net wage is fully declarative 
(respondents are explicitly told that the survey is anonymous). 
It is converted to euros at their 2012 value using the French 
inflation index computed by the French Statistical Office3.
Our explanatory variables are as follows. With regard to the res-
pondent’s own education, we use the highest diploma obtained 
in initial schooling, including apprenticeship. The FQP surveys 
allow us to use a detailed educational classification, namely the 
‘old’ version of the CASMIN educational schema with 9 catego-
ries (Brauns and Steinmann, 1999: Table A1; see Vallet, 2004: 
145 for the correspondence with French diplomas). These 
categories are: (1a) Inadequately completed general educa-
tion; (1b) General elementary education; (1c) Basic vocational 
qualification (with or without 1b); (2a) Intermediate vocational 
qualification (with or without 2b); (2b) Intermediate general 
qualification; (2c_voc) Vocational maturity certificate; (2c_gen) 
General maturity certificate; (3a) Lower tertiary education; (3b) 
Higher tertiary education.
Social origin of the respondent is measured using the dominant 
occupational prestige score of the parents, in the same Cham-
baz, Maurin and Torelli (1998) scale that we use for the res-
pondent’s own occupation. This score is defined as the highest 
of the two parents’ individual scores; when information about 
one of the parents is missing, the score of the other is used.
Several control variables are introduced in the third and sub-
sequent models. A ‘citizenship’ variable is created to control 
3. Available at http://www.insee.fr/fr/themes/calcul-pouvoir-
achat.asp 
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for the differences between native-born citizens, naturalized 
citizens and foreigners (all of which born in metropolitan 
France, cf. supra). The size of the urban or rural area where 
the parents of the respondent lived when he or she stopped 
attending school or university on a regular basis allows us to 
control for geographic differences in the structure of job op-
portunities at the end of youth. Employment status (salaried or 
self-employed) is introduced in the models regarding first and 
current job4 (but not wage, cf. supra), while work time of the 
respondent (full-time, part-time, unemployed) only concerns 
current job; we use it as a control variable because part-time 
work and unemployment are often undesired situations that 
negatively impact social status for a given value of the pres-
tige score. Finally, all models from the third one control for 
gender and, when analyzing first job variables, two dummies 
respectively capture membership of at least one of the grand-
fathers to the service class (EGP I-II), or the working class (EGP 
VI-VIIab), relative to all other situations.
While all first job variables are analyzed following a cohort 
perspective, distinguishing between those born between 1938-
44, 1945-50, 1951-56, 1957-62, 1963-68 and 1969-75 on the 
basis of the 2003 survey data, all current job variables and the 
logarithm of the wage are analyzed according to survey year 
(1977, 1985, 1993 and 2003), introducing age and age-squared 
as supplementary controls.
When we model the occupational prestige score and the loga-
rithm of the wage, we rely on standard ordinary least squares 
(OLS) regressions. As for the access to the service class and the 
avoidance of the working class, we use linear probability mo-
dels (LPM) estimated similarly. In both cases, sampling weights 
are used, and reported p-values are based on heteroskedasti-
city-robust sandwich (Huber-White) standard errors5.
4. Regarding current job, employment status is only introduced 
when modeling occupational prestige score and access to the 
service class because, for the avoidance of the working class, 
virtually no members of this class are self-employed in our da-
taset. 
5. Results associated with all our regression models are avai-
lable in a complementary appendix.
Descriptive Statistics
 
Educational expansion
As documented above, France experienced a significant educa-
tional expansion over the period we study, with an acceleration 
in the last (1969-75) birth cohort (Table 1). From the 1938-44 
cohort to the 1963-68 cohort, the share of people with inade-
quately completed general education (1a) did not significantly 
vary; it started decreasing only in the last cohort. By contrast, 
over all cohorts, the proportion of people with only general ele-
mentary education (1b) decreased dramatically, and this cate-
gory almost disappeared6. To a lower extent, basic vocational 
qualification (1c) also lost importance, particularly in the last 
cohort.
Most other educational levels increased their share. In particu-
lar, that of people with an intermediate vocational qualification 
(2a) doubled from 7.5% to 15.5%; that of people with a voca-
tional maturity certificate (2c_voc) increased by a factor of 7, 
from 2.1% to 13.6%; and that of higher educated (3a and 3b) 
more than tripled, from 10.5% to 36.7%. Only intermediate (2b) 
and maturity (2c_gen) general education certificates remained 
stable or slightly decreased (since a large part of their owners 
also obtained higher educational qualifications).
The acceleration of educational expansion we observe for the 
last cohort (1969-75) affects certificates above and including 
general and vocational maturity certificates (the Baccalauréat). 
This shift corresponds to a new policy initiated in 1985 by the 
socialist government and aiming at bringing “80% [of a cohort] 
to the Baccalauréat”. That year saw the creation of the Bacca-
lauréat professionnel, a new vocational track which comple-
mented the already existing Baccalauréat de technicien track 
(both corresponding to 2c_voc). This reform had been prepared 
since the 1960s by the progressive integration of the elementa-
ry, technical and general educational systems, which were pre-
6. The main certificate of the 1b category, the Certificat d’études 
primaires, progressively vanished between 1959 (when com-
pulsory schooling was extended until age 16), 1972 (when it 
remained open only to adults) and 1989 (when it was officially 
withdrawn).
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Table 1. Educational Distribution by Birth Cohort  
1938-44 1945-50 1951-56 1957-62 1963-68 1969-75
1a 21.4 17.6 18.7 20.8 18.5 13.7
1b 27.8 20.1 15.3   4.6   1.2   0.6
1c 16.8 18.8 16.9 14.5 13.6   7.7
2a   7.5   9.0 10.9 15.8 19.4 15.5
2b   9.0 10.6 10.9 12.8   9.3   6.3
2c_voc   2.1   4.1   5.2   7.1   9.2 13.6
2c_gen   4.8   5.1   6.3   6.8   5.5   6.0
3a   3.9   6.4   8.0 10.0 12.3 16.7
3b   6.6   8.4   7.8   7.7 10.9 19.9
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
 (Men and women born in metropolitan France aged 28 to 65 in 2003)
                                                   
Table 2. Social Class of First Job by Birth Cohort  
1938-44 1945-50 1951-56 1957-62 1963-68 1969-75
I   6.0   6.7   5.8   6.2   7.1 10.0
II 11.1 12.5 11.9 11.4 14.2 17.1
IIIa 16.6 19.7 21.9 21.8 21.1 19.4
IIIb 12.4 11.8 12.6 13.1 15.2 16.2
IVa   0.9   0.3   0.3   0.4   0.4   0.3
IVb   2.0   1.3   0.8   0.7   0.9   0.6
IVc   7.0   4.0   2.6   2.1   1.5   0.9
V   3.7   4.2   4.4   4.6   5.2   5.2
VI  12.5 13.1 13.2 14.0 13.3 12.2
VIIa 22.3 23.2 23.8 23.5 18.7 16.3
VIIb   5.6   3.3   2.6   2.4   2.6   2.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
 (Men and women born in metropolitan France aged 28 to 65 in 2003)
                                                   
Table 3. Ratio of Higher Educated to First Jobs in Service Class by Birth Cohort
1938-44 1945-50 1951-56 1957-62 1963-68 1969-75
Higher education 
(%)
10.5 14.8 15.8 17.6 23.2 36.7
First job in ser-
vice class (%)
17.0 19.2 17.7   17.6 21.3   27.0
Ratio   0.6   0.8   0.9   1.0   1.1   1.4
 (Men and women born in metropolitan France aged 28 to 65 in 2003)
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viously separated, into a unified track at the lower secondary 
level. Although the goal of 80% of a cohort at the Baccalauréat 
level is still not fulfilled in the present day, a major shift in the 
educational distribution ensued from this policy until 1995, 
when the rate of bacheliers stabilized around 65%. We ob-
serve this process – the second French educational expansion 
– almost entirely since the 1969-75 cohort typically graduated 
from the Baccalauréat (at age 18) between 1987 and 1993.
More limited upgrade of the structure of first jobs
The distribution of first jobs also changed significantly, although 
arguably not at the same rhythm as education (Table 2). Expan-
sion of the service class (I and II) is notable over the last three 
cohorts (born between 1957 and 1975), with a move from 
17.6% to 27.1% of first jobs. This increase has been too slow 
to absorb the expansion of the share of the higher educated 
(Table 3): the ratio of the latter to the former monotonically in-
creased from 0.6 to 1.4. While within the first cohort more than 
one third of first jobs in the service class had to be attributed 
to people with less than a higher education diploma, within the 
last cohort, one quarter of the higher educated could not find 
a first job in this class.
Salaried categories just below the service class only expanded 
slightly. Class IIIa increased its share in the first three cohorts 
(1938-56), but stabilized afterwards. Class V gained some im-
portance over all cohorts, but at a very slow pace.
At the bottom of the social structure, the share of blue collar (VI 
and VIIa) and agricultural workers (VIIb) decreased, especially 
for the semi- and unskilled workers (VIIa) over the last three 
cohorts. This change was partly compensated by the expansion 
of lower-grade routine non-manual positions (IIIb). Overall, the 
share of the working class decreased moderately, from around 
53% in the first four cohorts to 46.7% in the last one.
Regarding the petty bourgeoisie, first jobs were already below 
3% in the first cohort for IVa and IVb classes taken together; 
in the last cohort, they are below 1%. Farmers experienced a 
sharp reduction in their share, from 7% to less than 1%. Thus, 
in the most recent cohorts, first jobs almost always correspond 
to salaried positions.
Moreover, the French labor market has tended to provide the 
cohorts born from the early 1960s with less secure job positions, 
often characterized by part-time and short-term contracts. As a 
consequence of the divergent trend between the educational 
structure and the occupational structure (Table 3), some au-
thors have also emphasized an increasingly frequent mismatch 
between the qualification acquired in the educational system 
and that required on the job for the youngest generations (Bau-
delot and Glaude, 1989; Forgeot and Gautié, 1997; Goux and 
Maurin, 1998; Tomasini and Nauze-Fichet, 2002).
Results for Core Models: Occupational Prestige Score 
& Wage
First Research Question
Whether or not there is a direct effect of social origin over and 
above that of own education is a question that receives an indis-
putable positive answer. Let us first consider the analysis of oc-
cupational prestige score in the first job. Beginning with Model 
1 that only includes cohorts and parental occupational score, 
a substantial effect of the latter variable is revealed (+0.411). 
Most of it vanishes when the respondent’s education is addi-
tionally taken into account (Model 2). However, in this model, 
the net effect of the parental occupational score still amounts 
to +0.116 and remains highly significant. This effect is only 
very slightly reduced when introducing, in Model 3, additional 
control variables (employment status, gender, citizenship, area 
size of parental home, and grandfathers’ class position). The 
estimated coefficient of +0.096 implies that an increase in the 
parental score brings about a change of approximately 10% of 
its magnitude in the own score. Put in another way, a dominant 
parental score of 2.19 (the maximum value) rather than one of 
-1.52 (the minimum) brings a gain in own occupational pres-
tige score of 0.36, which amounts to 19% of the net advantage 
brought by the possession of a higher tertiary education diplo-
ma (3b) compared with an inadequately completed education 
(1a). The effect of having one grandfather in the service class is 
not significant at the 5% level, though the coefficient is positive 
(0.034)7. In Models 2 and 3 that control for education, we also 
7.  This coefficient increases to about 0.044 and becomes si-
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see a substantial and monotonic decline of the prestige score 
across cohorts, which illustrates the above mentioned loss of 
value of educational certificates.
Results are very similar when modeling occupational prestige 
score in the current job. In Model 3, the coefficient of 0.100 is 
very close to that obtained with the first job (0.096). Returns 
to higher education degrees are also very similar, but those 
associated with lower and intermediate diplomas (from 1b to 
2c) are clearly higher for the current job than for the first job. 
That suggests that, while tertiary diplomas ‘find their occupa-
tional value’ in allowing access to high positions from the very 
outset of the career, the advantage afforded by less prestigious 
degrees reveals itself later, allowing access to better positions 
via career mobility.
Coming to the logarithm of the net wage gained during the year 
before the survey, the origin effect can again be observed. It 
has indeed the same strength as for the current job prestige 
score when compared with the effect of own education. Again, 
control variables introduced in Model 3 do not change the size 
of this effect much. Here, after controlling for own education 
and other variables (including age and age-squared), an in-
crease of parental score from the minimum to the maximum 
value increases the net wage by 19%. This change amounts to 
15% of the increase due to the possession of the highest diplo-
ma (3b) rather than no diploma at all (1a), which multiplies the 
wage by a factor of 2.24.
Second Research Question
When we move to our second research question of whether or 
not the direct effect of social origin is weaker among the higher 
educated, the answer is again positive for occupational pres-
tige score in the first and the current job, but mixed for log net 
wage the year before the survey (Model 4). For prestige score 
in the first job, the effect of parental score culminates at 0.145 
for those with inadequately completed education (1a); it is si-
gnificantly weaker for people with at least a maturity certificate 
(2c), and especially for those with a general maturity certificate 
(2c_gen) and a lower tertiary education diploma (3a). For the 
gnificant at the 5% level in subsequent models that include the 
interactions discussed below.  
3a category, the effect of parental score almost disappears (it 
only amounts to 0.024), though it slightly rises to 0.059 for the 
most educated (3b). This pattern can be observed even more 
clearly for the prestige score in the current job. Here the effect 
of parental score culminates at 0.191 for the 1a category, but 
is nil for the 3a one, and only amounts at 0.042 for the 3b one. 
As for the socioeconomic value of the first and current jobs, 
we thus conclude that a higher social background may compen-
sate, to some extent, less remarkable educational assets, and 
even more in the course of the career than at its outset.
Finally, regarding log net wage the year before the survey, the 
hypothesis is only partly confirmed. Generally speaking, the 
effect of parental score is weaker, though still visible, among 
those who are more educated. However, it is significantly larger 
for the most educated (3b) than for those immediately below 
(3a, 2c_voc, 2c_gen); this difference also exists, but is not as 
visible, when modeling occupational prestige score.
Third Research Question
Whether or not we observe a temporal decline of the direct 
effect of social origin is a question that receives mixed results. 
The effect of parental score on prestige score in the first job mo-
notonically declines over cohorts when returns to education are 
assumed to have remained the same for all cohorts (Model 5). 
This effect is reduced by 31% in the 1969-75 cohort compared 
with the 1938-44 cohort (Figure 1). Under the abovementioned 
hypothesis, we would therefore conclude that, at the outset 
of the occupational career, ascription has declined relative to 
achievement.
Concerning prestige score in the current job, our conclusions 
are different. While we do observe a significant decline of 12% 
in the effect of parental score for the 1993 survey (in contrast 
with the 1977 one), no statistically significant decline is visible 
for 1985 and 2003. As for log net wage the year before the sur-
vey, no clear evolution is visible across surveys: taking 1977 as 
a reference, a statistically significant 30% decline of the effect 
of parental score in 1985 is followed by a non-significant 13% 
reduction in 1993, then a significant 19% decline in 2003 (see 
Figure 2). The 1977 survey thus appears to be different from 
the three other ones, but no trend can be identified. At a more 
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Figure 1: Effect of Parental Occupational Score on First Job over Cohorts
Note: From Model 4 onwards, the displayed coefficients are those for educational category 1a. However, the variation over cohorts 
is common to all educational categories.
mature stage in the occupational career, we would conclude 
that ascription does not have significantly declined in France 
over the last decades, even when assuming that educational 
returns have remained constant – an assumption we need to 
relax in the light of the findings of our fourth research question.
Fourth Research Question
The question of whether returns to education have varied over 
time puts into perspective the results we have just commented 
on. Indeed, relaxing the hypothesis that returns to education 
have remained constant leads to quite different conclusions. 
For prestige score in first and in current job, as well as for log 
net wage the year before the survey, returns to education 
have dramatically varied over time. Introducing the interaction 
between cohort or survey year and educational level in Model 6 
significantly decreases the AIC and BIC statistics compared with 
Model 5 for all three outcomes, despite the large number of 
degrees of freedom consumed by these additional parameters. 
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Figure 2: Effect of Parental Occupational Score on Current Job over Survey Years
Note: From Model 4 onwards, the displayed coefficients are those for educational category 1a. However, the variation over cohorts 
is common to all educational categories.
12 Notes & Documents de l’OSC n° 2016-5 Bouchet-Valat, Peugny, Vallet
This emphasizes the fact that temporal dynamics in educational 
returns must be taken into account.
For all outcomes, the direct effect of parental score as well 
as the interaction between parental score and education are 
not seriously affected by the introduction of time-dependent 
educational returns in Model 6. We still observe the already 
mentioned curvilinear pattern for the effect of parental score: 
it again decreases with the educational level until the lower 
tertiary education category (3a), but goes up for the higher 
tertiary one (3b). Thus, the answers to our first two research 
questions presented above still hold.
On the contrary, the variation over cohorts or survey years in 
the effect of parental score dramatically changes after allowing 
for temporal dynamics in educational returns. While we obser-
ved in Model 5 a decline in the effect of parental origin on pres-
tige score in the first job, and no clear trend for prestige score in 
the current job nor for log net wage the year before the survey, 
we do however observe in Model 6 a significant increase in the 
effect of parental score on prestige score in both first and cur-
rent jobs. The answer to our third research question must thus 
be revised.
Regarding prestige score in the first job, a slow but steady in-
crease in the effect of parental score takes place over the first 
five cohorts (born from 1938 to 1968), and a dramatic shift af-
fects the last one (1969-75). For that cohort, the direct effect 
of parental score significantly exceeds by 41% the one mea-
sured for the first cohort (Figure 1). The conclusion is similar for 
prestige score in the current job, with the effect of social origin 
monotonically increasing over survey years, especially between 
1993 and 2003 (Figure 2). Compared with the estimation for 
1977, the direct effect of parental score is significantly higher 
by 28% in 2003. The fact that this ‘increasing ascription effect’ 
is more markedly revealed with the first job than the current 
job suggests that it should primarily be interpreted as a cohort 
effect characterizing men and women born from the late 1960s 
to the mid-1970s. The change observed between 1993 and 
2003 for the current job would therefore reflect a cohort rather 
than a period effect.
Our results are different for log net wage the year before the 
survey: no sign of a change over time is visible for this outcome 
Figure 3: Interaction Education × Cohort (Prestige Score in First Job – Model 6)
(For each degree, the line represents the gain or loss in terms of prestige score, as compared with the 1938-44 cohort)
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variable in Model 6. Only small and non-significant fluctuations 
can be observed for 1985 and 1993; in 2003 the effect of paren-
tal score is back to exactly the same value as in 1977 (Figure 2).
Overall, we observe no indication of a decreasing ascription in 
France over the last decades. On the contrary, strong signs of 
an increased effect of social origin on the occupational status in 
both the first and the current job are visible in the most recent 
cohort (1969-75) and survey (2003). The second educational 
expansion that took place in France does not appear to have 
met its goals in terms of reducing ascription effects on the labor 
market.
-0
.5
-0
.4
-0
.3
-0
.2
-0
.1
0.
0
1977 1985 1993 2003
1b
1c
2a
2b
2c_gen
2c_voc
3a
3b
-0
.2
5-
0.
20
-0
.1
5-
0.
10
-0
.0
5
0.
00
1977 1985 1993 2003
1b
1c
2a
2b
2c_gen
2c_voc
3a
3b
Figure 4:  
Interaction Education × Survey Year 
(Prestige Score in Current Job – Model 6)
 
(For each degree, the line represents the gain or 
loss in terms of prestige score, as compared with 
the 1977 survey)
Figure 5:  
Interaction Education × Survey Year  
(Log Net Wage Year Before Survey –  
Model 6) 
(For each degree, the line represents the gain or 
loss in terms of log net wage, as compared with the 
1977 survey)
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Indeed, the general rise in the educational level of more re-
cent cohorts has lead to a massive decrease of educational 
returns, visible for all certificates – especially the intermediate 
ones (2a, 2b, 2c) – as regards prestige score in the first job, as 
well as prestige score in the current job and log net wage the 
year before the survey8. The loss of value of degrees in terms 
of prestige score in the first job (Figure 3) essentially started 
with the 1951-56 cohort, especially for the general Baccalau-
réat (2c_gen), and has progressively affected all degrees at an 
accelerating pace. Regarding prestige score in the current job 
(Figure 4), the decrease is very steady over surveys and affects 
all certificates at the same rhythm. Finally, returns in terms of 
log net wage (Figure 5) have followed the same pattern, though 
the evolution is less regular in the last survey.
Class Analysis: Access to Service Class & Avoidance 
of Working Class
First research question
Similar analyses based on our class-related dependent va-
riables confirm the results detailed above and often allow 
for a finer description of the recent changes that occurred in 
French society (Figures 1 and 2). The direct effect of parental 
occupational score on the probability of directly entering the 
service class (first job) or belonging to it (current job) is again 
noticeable. After controlling for the respondent’s education 
(Model 2), and additional variables (Model 3), going from a 
parental score of -1.52 (the minimum) to 2.19 (the maximum) 
adds 10 to 11 percentage points to the probability of directly 
entering the service class (I-II). Moreover, having at least one 
grandfather in the service class increases this probability by 2.6 
percentage points (coefficient significant at the 1% level); this 
‘dynasty’ effect is indeed more marked than for prestige score 
in the first job9. The direct effect of parental score is noticeably 
8.  As stated in note 6, category 1b progressively disappeared 
over the period and its recent variation is not meaningful. 
9.  It is also the case in the analysis of occupational prestige 
score. In Model 2 that only controls for education and cohort 
(or survey and age), the regression coefficient associated with 
parental score is 0.116 for the first job and 0.134 for the current 
job.
larger when considering the current rather than the first job10: 
the probability gap between the two extremes of the paren-
tal scale is of 13 percentage points instead of 10 or 11. Finally, 
these features are replicated with regard to the avoidance of 
the working class. Here, the direct effect of parental score (esti-
mated between the two extremes of the parental scale) is circa 
18 percentage points in the first job and circa 24 points in the 
current job.
With our class-related dependent variables, we again clearly 
observe the consequences of credentials inflation: for a given 
educational level, occupational opportunities have declined, 
essentially from the 1951-56 cohort onwards.
Second research question
With our class-related dependent variables, the direct effect of 
social origin is again weaker among the higher educated (Mo-
del 4). When considering the avoidance of the working class in 
either the first or the current job, the effect of parental back-
ground totally disappears for tertiary degree holders (3a and 
3b). As for belonging to the service class in the current job, the 
effect is reduced by three quarters while no interaction effect 
between parental score and education can be found with re-
gard to a first job experience in the service class.
These results allow for a deeper understanding of the pro-
cesses at play than the analysis of prestige score alone. Even 
though tertiary education protects from ever being a member 
of the working class, whatever one’s social origins were, and 
also warrants access to the service class later in one’s career, it 
now appears that in getting a service class position in the first 
job, parental background matters even for the higher educated. 
This might be attributed to a social capital effect. We have 
already stressed that wage earned the year before the survey 
depends on parental background among lower (3a), and even 
more among higher (3b) tertiary degree holders. Social origin is 
therefore a major asset when trying to secure access to top-le-
vel occupational positions. 
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Third research question
Assuming that the returns to education have remained constant 
over time (Model 5; Figures 1 and 2), we do observe a clear de-
cline in the effect of social origin for entering the service class in 
the first job (a decrease of 80% in the 1969-75 cohort compared 
with the 1938-44 cohort). On the contrary, our estimates re-
veal a rising social origin effect for the avoidance of the working 
class in the current job (an increase of 18% in 2003 compared 
with 1977). Finally, with regard to access to the service class in 
the current job and avoidance of the working class in the first 
job, no significant evolution can be observed at all. Our results 
are therefore inconsistent. They certainly do not allow us to 
conclude that ascription has declined in France in the recent 
period – under the (temporary) hypothesis that educational re-
turns have remained constant.
Fourth research question
Here again, we can reply very clearly that returns to education 
have massively decreased over time (Model 6). With regard 
to access to the service class in the first job, the decline is the 
most marked for holders of an academic Baccalauréat (2c_gen), 
followed by those of lower (3a), then higher (3b) tertiary certi-
ficates, i.e. those groups that are most likely to get a job in the 
service class. With the higher educated progressively outnum-
bering job positions in the service class (Table 3), holders of an 
academic Baccalauréat have found it harder and harder to se-
cure access to these occupational positions. When  we consider 
the current job, the decrease has affected all intermediate qua-
lifications (2a, 2b, 2c_gen and 2c_voc), lower tertiary degrees 
(3a), but less the highest qualified (3b). The former groups were 
previously able to attain service class positions through promo-
tions during their careers, which is less likely today due to the 
exacerbated competition from more educated individuals.
These categories with secondary or lower tertiary qualifications 
have also been the most affected by the decline in educational 
returns with regard to avoiding the working class in the first 
job. As for the current job, it is remarkable that tertiary educa-
tion certificates protect from demotion into the working class 
as strongly in 2003 as in 1977; returns to a general Baccalauréat 
have only slightly declined while all other qualifications have 
been sharply affected.
Here as in our core models, the direct effect of parental score 
as well as the interaction between parental score and educa-
tion are not seriously affected by these tremendous changes in 
educational returns. But the time trend in the effect of parental 
background is, as above, transformed.
Concerning the first job, results rather consistently suggest a 
rising effect of social origin (Figure 1). With regard to access 
to the service class, an increase of the effect of parental back-
ground appears in the last three cohorts: the impact of social 
origin is doubled from the 1938-44 cohort to the 1969-75 one. 
This rising ascription effect is most pronounced and statistically 
significant between the 1951-56 and 1957-62 cohorts, which 
may be related to the strong increase in youth unemployment 
– from 6.8% in 1975 to 15.4% in 1982 among the 15-24 (INSEE, 
2013). With regard to avoiding the working class, the coeffi-
cient for the last cohort is again close to statistical significance 
and points to an increase of 29% of the ascription effect.
Analyses based on the current job confirm these findings (Fi-
gure 2). With regard to access to the service class and com-
pared with 1977, two highly significant increases appear in 
1985 and 2003, the latter being almost twice the magnitude of 
the former. The effect of parental background is higher by 79% 
in 2003 compared to 1977. For the avoidance of the working 
class, the corresponding increase is steady and amounts to 13% 
in 2003 (significant at the 1% level).
Conclusion
Inspired by a pioneering article by Erikson and Jonsson (1998) 
in which they examined whether social origin still has an ef-
fect on the occupational career, even when acquired education 
is measured with considerable detail, our analytical effort has 
scrutinized the existence, structure and variations of a short- 
and long-term impact of parental background in France, after 
controlling for the effect of education in a detailed way – the 
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CASMIN educational schema with 9 categories. Our main 
conclusions can be summarized as follows.
First, whatever the indicator of labor market success – occupa-
tional prestige score, access to service class, avoidance of wor-
king class, wage earned – a ‘direct’ effect of class origin or pa-
rental background does exist in contemporary French society. 
This effect is more visible at an advanced stage of the occupa-
tional career than at its outset. In other words, the influence of 
parental origin seems to increase over the life course, being less 
pronounced for the first job than for the current job.
Second, the ‘direct’ origin effect generally varies in strength 
over educational categories, being weaker or non-existent 
among the higher educated. Put in the opposite way, to a cer-
tain extent a higher social background is able to compensate 
for less prominent educational assets, and even more so in the 
course of the career than at its outset.
Third, the ‘direct’ origin effect has indeed strengthened in the 
most recent cohorts or the last decade observed. And fourth, 
this can be related to the declining occupational returns to edu-
cation, in the context of sustained educational expansion that 
has characterized France in the post-Second World War period.
Coming back to the first parts of our chapter, these empirical 
results certainly cast doubts on the validity of the ‘Increased 
Merit Selection’ hypothesis. On the other hand, they are fully 
consistent with what Thélot (1982) already observed, on the 
basis of 1970 data, about the long-lasting influence of class 
origin; as well as with the results by Peugny (2007) about the 
relative importance of education and social background as de-
terminants of status attained and its dynamics over cohorts. In 
themselves, our results are not contradictory with the increase 
in social fluidity that has been observed in France in the last half 
century. They certainly suggest that the temporal dynamics of 
the ‘direct’ origin effect have played a null, then negative role 
in the increase in social fluidity, thereby underlining the central 
role that both declining inequality of educational opportunity 
and educational expansion have played in this respect (Vallet, 
2004). Ultimately, our results raise the question of whether 
such an increase in social fluidity will go on in the future, in a 
context of weak economic growth, a persistently high unem-
ployment rate, and an increasing disequilibrium between the 
distribution of acquired degrees and the structure of available 
positions, which produces a decline of occupational returns to 
education.
Finally, we must recognize that our data, while being quite 
powerful in establishing these empirical facts, are poorly suited 
to scrutinize the very substance of the ‘direct’ origin effect and 
to trace the concrete channels by which parental background 
exerts its long-lasting influence in French society. Additional 
work would be needed in this respect, following for instance 
the ‘Social networks’, ‘Favouritism’, ‘Productivity’ and ‘Aspira-
tions’ mechanisms that Erikson and Jonsson (1998) have put 
forward.
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Appendix - Detailed Linear Model Results
Prestige Score of First Job - Unstandardized Coefficients
       (1)      (2)      (3)      (4)      (5)      (6) 
Intercept                        -0.358 ***  -0.794 ***  -0.932 ***  -0.912 ***  -0.907 ***  -1.060 ***
Cohort:1938-44  0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000 
Cohort:1945-50  0.043 *  -0.059 ***  -0.049 **  -0.048 **  -0.050 **  -0.046 
Cohort:1951-56  0.017  -0.126 ***  -0.110 ***  -0.108 ***  -0.114 ***  -0.061 
Cohort:1957-62  -0.014  -0.208 ***  -0.187 ***  -0.185 ***  -0.190 ***  -0.056 
Cohort:1963-68  0.008  -0.257 ***  -0.232 ***  -0.231 ***  -0.236 ***  -0.002 
Cohort:1969-75  0.060 **  -0.395 ***  -0.365 ***  -0.364 ***  -0.367 ***    0.080 *
            
Parental Score  0.411 ***  0.116 ***  0.096 ***  0.145 ***  0.173 ***  0.119 ***
Educ:1a     0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Educ:1b                          -0.022                       -0.035 *                       -0.037                       -0.039  0.080 *
Educ:1c     0.259 ***  0.273 ***  0.252 ***  0.251 ***  0.332 ***
Educ:2a     0.498 ***  0.491 ***  0.470 ***  0.470 ***  0.726 ***
Educ:2b     0.519 ***  0.518 ***  0.498 ***  0.497 ***  0.787 ***
Educ:2c_gen    1.075 ***  1.071 ***  1.063 ***  1.064 ***  1.603 ***
Educ:2c_voc     0.825 ***  0.823 ***  0.800 ***  0.800 ***  0.937 ***
Educ:3a     1.419 ***  1.417 ***  1.418 ***  1.418 ***  1.778 ***
Educ:3b     1.908 ***  1.898 ***  1.898 ***  1.898 ***  2.073 ***
            
Status:Other      0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Status:Self-employed      0.357 ***  0.357 ***  0.358 ***  0.376 ***
Sex:Male       0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Sex:Female       0.048 ***  0.049 ***  0.048 ***  0.053 ***
Citizen:Native Born      0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Citizen:Naturalized      0.001  -0.001  -0.002  -0.005 
Citizen:Foreigner      0.099  0.095  0.092  0.082 
AreaSize:Rural      0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
AreaSize:<10K Inhab      0.056 ***  0.056 ***  0.055 ***  0.048 **
AreaSize:<50K      0.053 ***  0.054 ***  0.054 ***  0.049 ***
AreaSize:<200K      0.071 ***  0.072 ***  0.071 ***  0.063 ***
AreaSize:<2M      0.097 ***  0.099 ***  0.098 ***  0.091 ***
AreaSize:Paris      0.212 ***  0.213 ***  0.212 ***  0.204 ***
Grandfather:I-II      0.034  0.046 *  0.044 *  0.040 *
Grandfather:VI-VIIab      0.009  0.008  0.008  0.010 
Grandfather:Other      0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
            
Parental Score*Educ:1a        0.000  0.000  0.000 
Parental Score*Educ:1b                                                -0.007                       -0.021  0.016 
Parental Score*Educ:1c                                                 -0.044 *                       -0.047 *                       -0.030 
Parental Score*Educ:2a                                                  -0.041                       -0.034                       -0.032 
Parental Score*Educ:2b                           0.004  0.004  0.014 
Parental Score*Educ:2c_gen                                                                         -0.106 ***                       -0.102 ***                       -0.073 
Parental Score*Educ:2c_voc                           -0.064 *                       -0.055 *                       -0.059 *
Parental Score*Educ:3a                            -0.121 ***                       -0.113 ***                       -0.116 ***
Parental Score*Educ:3b                            -0.086 ***                       -0.078 ***                       -0.082 ***
            
Parental Score*Cohort:1938-44         0.000  0.000 
Parental Score*Cohort:1945-50                             -0.006  0.005 
Parental Score*Cohort:1951-56                             -0.027  0.007 
Parental Score*Cohort:1957-62                             -0.031  0.010 
Parental Score*Cohort:1963-68                             -0.045 *  0.016 
Parental Score*Cohort:1969-75                             -0.053 **                        0.049 *
            
Educ:1a*Cohort:1938-44            0.000 
Educ:1a*Cohort:1945-50            0.000 
Educ:1a*Cohort:1951-56            0.000 
Educ:1a*Cohort:1957-62            0.000 
Educ:1a*Cohort:1963-68            0.000 
Educ:1a*Cohort:1969-75            0.000 
Educ:1b*Cohort:1938-44            0.000 
Educ:1b*Cohort:1945-50                                 -0.011 
Educ:1b*Cohort:1951-56            0.012 
Educ:1b*Cohort:1957-62                                 -0.004 
Educ:1b*Cohort:1963-68            0.024 
Educ:1b*Cohort:1969-75                                 -0.120 
Educ:1c*Cohort:1938-44            0.000 
Educ:1c*Cohort:1945-50            0.055 
Educ:1c*Cohort:1951-56            0.013 
Educ:1c*Cohort:1957-62                                 -0.053 
Educ:1c*Cohort:1963-68                                 -0.154 **
Educ:1c*Cohort:1969-75                                 -0.251 ***
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Educ:2a*Cohort:1938-44            0.000 
Educ:2a*Cohort:1945-50                                -0.116 
Educ:2a*Cohort:1951-56                                -0.115 
Educ:2a*Cohort:1957-62                                -0.233 ***
Educ:2a*Cohort:1963-68                                -0.394 ***
Educ:2a*Cohort:1969-75                                -0.533 ***
Educ:2b*Cohort:1938-44            0.000 
Educ:2b*Cohort:1945-50                                -0.057 
Educ:2b*Cohort:1951-56                                -0.175 *
Educ:2b*Cohort:1957-62                                -0.419 ***
Educ:2b*Cohort:1963-68                                -0.396 ***
Educ:2b*Cohort:1969-75                                -0.529 ***
Educ:2c_gen*Cohort:1938-44           0.000 
Educ:2c_gen*Cohort:1945-50                               -0.078 
Educ:2c_gen*Cohort:1951-56                               -0.501 ***
Educ:2c_gen*Cohort:1957-62                               -0.549 ***
Educ:2c_gen*Cohort:1963-68                               -0.674 ***
Educ:2c_gen*Cohort:1969-75                               -1.134 ***
Educ:2c_voc*Cohort:1938-44           0.000 
Educ:2c_voc*Cohort:1945-50           0.075 
Educ:2c_voc*Cohort:1951-56           0.079 
Educ:2c_voc*Cohort:1957-62                               -0.065 
Educ:2c_voc*Cohort:1963-68                               -0.223 *
Educ:2c_voc*Cohort:1969-75                               -0.496 ***
Educ:3a*Cohort:1938-44             0.000 
Educ:3a*Cohort:1945-50                                -0.091 
Educ:3a*Cohort:1951-56                                -0.134 
Educ:3a*Cohort:1957-62                                -0.210 **
Educ:3a*Cohort:1963-68                                -0.429 ***
Educ:3a*Cohort:1969-75                                -0.838 ***
Educ:3b*Cohort:1938-44             0.000 
Educ:3b*Cohort:1945-50                                -0.014 
Educ:3b*Cohort:1951-56                                -0.092 
Educ:3b*Cohort:1957-62                                -0.116 
Educ:3b*Cohort:1963-68                                -0.257 ***
Educ:3b*Cohort:1969-75                                -0.479 ***
N                       27540                      27540                      27540                      27540                      27540                      27540 
R2                        0.139                       0.462                       0.472                        0.473                       0.474                        0.485 
AIC                       71708                      58793                      58266                      58216                      58213                      57698 
BIC                       71765                      58916                      58480                      58496                      58534                      58347 
Men and women born in metropolitan France aged 28 to 65 in 2003.
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
The parental dominant prestige score is in the interval [-1.52; 2.19].
(Models 2-3) After controlling for education (and possibly some other variables), a substantial effect of parental score remains. Controlling for education, we also see a substantial 
decline of the prestige score across cohorts.
(Model 4) The hypothesis is confirmed: the effect of parental score is weaker, though still visible, amongst the most educated.
(Model 5) The hypothesis is confirmed: the effect of parental score monotonically declines over the birth cohorts.
(Model 6) But the returns of education in terms of prestige of the first job have declined over cohorts. When the latter effect is taken into account, the interaction between edu-
cation and parental score is still robust. However, this is not the case for the interaction between parental score and cohort: indeed, ascription has significantly increased in the 
youngest cohort (1969-1975).
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First Job in Service Class (I, II) - Unstandardized Coefficients
      (1)     (2)     (3)     (4)     (5)     (6) 
Intercept                         0.203 ***   0.087 ***  -0.932 ***   0.075 ***   0.078 ***   0.027 **
Cohort:1938-44  0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000 
Cohort:1945-50  0.017 *  -0.013 *  -0.014 *  -0.015 *  -0.017 *  -0.011 
Cohort:1951-56  0.002  -0.040 ***  -0.042 ***  -0.042 ***  -0.047 ***  -0.019 
Cohort:1957-62                       -0.012  -0.064 ***  -0.066 ***  -0.066 ***  -0.069 ***  -0.006 
Cohort:1963-68  0.012  -0.062 ***  -0.064 ***  -0.064 ***  -0.068 ***  -0.002 
Cohort:1969-75  0.052 ***  -0.102 ***  -0.104 ***  -0.104 ***  -0.106 ***    0.014 
            
Parental Score  0.148 ***  0.030 ***  0.027 ***  0.023 ***  0.041 ***  0.016 *
Educ:1a     0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Educ:1b                         -0.032 ***                           -0.030 ***                       -0.036 ***                       -0.037 ***                       -0.002 
Educ:1c                         -0.011 **                       -0.011 **                      - 0.013 *                       -0.013 *                       -0.003
Educ:2a     0.037 ***  0.037 ***  0.037 ***  0.037 ***  0.062 **
Educ:2b     0.094 ***  0.091 ***  0.094 ***  0.094 ***  0.187 ***
Educ:2c_gen    0.370 ***  0.365 ***  0.372 ***  0.372 ***  0.653 ***
Educ:2c_voc     0.149 ***  0.147 ***  0.149 ***  0.149 ***  0.153 **
Educ:3a     0.472 ***  0.467 ***  0.463 ***  0.463 ***  0.675 ***
Educ:3b     0.752 ***  0.745 ***  0.745 ***  0.746 ***  0.814 ***
            
Status:Other      0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Status:Self-employed                          -0.045 ***                      -0.044 ***                      -0.043 ***                      -0.035 ***
Sex:Male       0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Sex:Female       0.018 ***  0.018 ***  0.018 ***  0.021 ***
Citizen:Native Born      0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Citizen:Naturalized      0.027  0.027  0.027  0.026 
Citizen:Foreigner      0.001  0.004  0.003  0.001 
AreaSize:Rural      0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
AreaSize:<10K Inhab      0.011   0.011   0.011   0.007
AreaSize:<50K      0.003  0.003   0.002   0.000
AreaSize:<200K      0.010  0.010   0.010   0.008
AreaSize:<2M      0.011 *  0.011   0.011   0.008 
AreaSize:Paris      0.018 *  0.018 *  0.017 *  0.016 *
Grandfather:I-II      0.026 **  0.024 *  0.023 *  0.020 *
Grandfather:VI-VIIab                          -0.007                       -0.007                       -0.007                       -0.008 
Grandfather:Other      0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
            
Parental Score*Educ:1a        0.000  0.000  0.000 
Parental Score*Educ:1b                                                -0.012                       -0.017 **                       -0.000 
Parental Score*Educ:1c                                                 -0.007                       -0.008                        -0.003 
Parental Score*Educ:2a                                                  -0.004                       -0.001                       -0.004 
Parental Score*Educ:2b                           0.023 *  0.024 *  0.026 ** 
Parental Score*Educ:2c_gen                                                                         -0.013                        -0.011                         0.002 
Parental Score*Educ:2c_voc                            0.012                        0.017                         0.011 
Parental Score*Educ:3a                             0.020                        0.025 *                        0.020 
Parental Score*Educ:3b                             0.006                         0.011                         0.007 
            
Parental Score*Cohort:1938-44         0.000  0.000 
Parental Score*Cohort:1945-50                             -0.011                       -0.008 
Parental Score*Cohort:1951-56                             -0.026 **                       -0.011 
Parental Score*Cohort:1957-62                             -0.014  0.013 
Parental Score*Cohort:1963-68                             -0.021 *  0.014 
Parental Score*Cohort:1969-75                             -0.033 ***                        0.017 
            
Educ:1a*Cohort:1938-44            0.000 
Educ:1a*Cohort:1945-50            0.000 
Educ:1a*Cohort:1951-56            0.000 
Educ:1a*Cohort:1957-62            0.000 
Educ:1a*Cohort:1963-68            0.000 
Educ:1a*Cohort:1969-75            0.000 
Educ:1b*Cohort:1938-44            0.000 
Educ:1b*Cohort:1945-50                                 -0.003 
Educ:1b*Cohort:1951-56            0.001 
Educ:1b*Cohort:1957-62                                  0.001 
Educ:1b*Cohort:1963-68            0.043 
Educ:1b*Cohort:1969-75                                 -0.037 ** 
Educ:1c*Cohort:1938-44            0.000 
Educ:1c*Cohort:1945-50                                 -0.001 
Educ:1c*Cohort:1951-56                                 -0.001 
Educ:1c*Cohort:1957-62                                  0.001 
Educ:1c*Cohort:1963-68                                  0.001 
Educ:1c*Cohort:1969-75                                 -0.015 
Educ:2a*Cohort:1938-44            0.000 
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Educ:2a*Cohort:1945-50                                 -0.001 
Educ:2a*Cohort:1951-56                                 -0.028 
Educ:2a*Cohort:1957-62                                 -0.040 
Educ:2a*Cohort:1963-68                                 -0.047 *
Educ:2a*Cohort:1969-75                                 -0.054 *
Educ:2b*Cohort:1938-44            0.000 
Educ:2b*Cohort:1945-50                                 -0.064 * 
Educ:2b*Cohort:1951-56                                 -0.065 *
Educ:2b*Cohort:1957-62                                 -0.160 ***
Educ:2b*Cohort:1963-68                                 -0.089 **
Educ:2b*Cohort:1969-75                                 -0.116 ***
Educ:2c_gen*Cohort:1938-44           0.000 
Educ:2c_gen*Cohort:1945-50                                -0.052 
Educ:2c_gen*Cohort:1951-56                                -0.314 ***
Educ:2c_gen*Cohort:1957-62                                -0.337 ***
Educ:2c_gen*Cohort:1963-68                                -0.379 ***
Educ:2c_gen*Cohort:1969-75                                -0.444 ***
Educ:2c_voc*Cohort:1938-44           0.000 
Educ:2c_voc*Cohort:1945-50           0.027 
Educ:2c_voc*Cohort:1951-56           0.019 
Educ:2c_voc*Cohort:1957-62                                -0.032 
Educ:2c_voc*Cohort:1963-68                                -0.030
Educ:2c_voc*Cohort:1969-75                                -0.054 
Educ:3a*Cohort:1938-44             0.000 
Educ:3a*Cohort:1945-50                                 -0.069 
Educ:3a*Cohort:1951-56                                 -0.079 
Educ:3a*Cohort:1957-62                                 -0.179 ***
Educ:3a*Cohort:1963-68                                 -0.263 ***
Educ:3a*Cohort:1969-75                                 -0.374 ***
Educ:3b*Cohort:1938-44             0.000 
Educ:3b*Cohort:1945-50                                  0.026 
Educ:3b*Cohort:1951-56                                 -0.030 
Educ:3b*Cohort:1957-62                                 -0.069 
Educ:3b*Cohort:1963-68                                 -0.084 *
Educ:3b*Cohort:1969-75                                 -0.167 ***
N                       27540                      27540                      27540                      27540                      27540                      27540 
R2                        0.107                       0.421                       0.423                       0.423                       0.424                       0.437 
AIC                       24958                      13062                      12988                      12979                      12968                      12410 
BIC                       25016                      13186                      13202                      13259                      13289                      13060 
Men and women born in metropolitan France aged 28 to 65 in 2003.
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
The story is about the same. However, the structural interaction between parental score and education does not exist at all, and the increase in the ascription effect is not significant 
in the most recent cohort (p-value of .111).
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First Job Outside of the Working Class (IIIb, VI, VIIab) - Unstandardized Coefficients
     (1)    (2)    (3)    (4)    (5)    (6) 
Intercept   0.511 ***  0.305 ***  0.137 ***  0.145 ***  0.147 ***  0.076 ***
Cohort:1938-44  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Cohort:1945-50  0.008                       -0.038 ***                       -0.021 *                       -0.020 *                       -0.021 *                       -0.024 
Cohort:1951-56                       -0.001                       -0.070 ***                       -0.043 ***                       -0.042 ***                       -0.043 ***                       -0.020 
Cohort:1957-62                       -0.022 *                       -0.123 ***                       -0.089 ***                       -0.088 ***                       -0.090 ***                       -0.032 
Cohort:1963-68                       -0.006                       -0.135 ***                       -0.098 ***                       -0.097 ***                       -0.098 ***                       -0.002 
Cohort:1969-75  0.003                       -0.205 ***                       -0.160 ***                       -0.159 ***                       -0.160 ***  0.069 ***
            
Parental Score  0.178 ***  0.054 ***  0.045 ***  0.067 ***  0.076 ***  0.059 ***
Educ:1a     0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Educ:1b     0.020                       -0.005  0.002  0.001  0.067 ***
Educ:1c     0.057 ***  0.083 ***  0.079 ***  0.079 ***  0.125 ***
Educ:2a     0.299 ***  0.286 ***  0.277 ***  0.277 ***  0.426 ***
Educ:2b     0.338 ***  0.329 ***  0.320 ***  0.320 ***  0.502 ***
Educ:2c_gen    0.561 ***  0.541 ***  0.539 ***  0.539 ***  0.706 ***
Educ:2c_voc     0.476 ***  0.467 ***  0.456 ***  0.456 ***  0.480 ***
Educ:3a     0.675 ***  0.664 ***  0.668 ***  0.668 ***  0.740 ***
Educ:3b     0.726 ***  0.719 ***  0.735 ***  0.735 ***  0.787 ***
            
Status:Other      0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Status:Self-employed      0.445 ***  0.446 ***  0.446 ***  0.452 ***
Sex:Male       0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Sex:Female       0.175 ***  0.176 ***  0.175 ***  0.176 ***
Citizen:Native Born      0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Citizen:Naturalized                           -0.002                       -0.003                       -0.003                       -0.005 
Citizen:Foreigner      0.032  0.028  0.028  0.017 
AreaSize:Rural      0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
AreaSize:<10K Inhab      0.017 *  0.017 *  0.017 *  0.015 
AreaSize:<50K      0.014  0.014  0.014  0.013 
AreaSize:<200K      0.027 **  0.027 **  0.027 **  0.024 **
AreaSize:<2M      0.036 ***  0.037 ***  0.037 ***  0.035 ***
AreaSize:Paris      0.114 ***  0.114 ***  0.114 ***  0.111 ***
            
Grandfather:I-II      0.015  0.025 **  0.025 **  0.025 **
Grandfather:VI-VIIab                           -0.001                       -0.001                       -0.001  0.001 
Grandfather:Other      0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
            
Parental Score*Educ:1a        0.000  0.000  0.000 
Parental Score*Educ:1b        0.014  0.009  0.020 
Parental Score*Educ:1c                             -0.006                       -0.007  0.000 
Parental Score*Educ:2a                             -0.013                       -0.011                       -0.008 
Parental Score*Educ:2b        0.016  0.016  0.021 
Parental Score*Educ:2c_gen                                                 -0.056 ***                       -0.056 ***                       -0.044 **
Parental Score*Educ:2c_voc                                                 -0.025                       -0.024                       -0.019 
Parental Score*Educ:3a                             -0.070 ***                       -0.068 ***                       -0.066 ***
Parental Score*Educ:3b                             -0.064 ***                       -0.063 ***                       -0.062 ***
            
Parental Score*Cohort:1938-44         0.000  0.000 
Parental Score*Cohort:1945-50                              -0.003  0.004 
Parental Score*Cohort:1951-56                              -0.004  0.008 
Parental Score*Cohort:1957-62                              -0.015                       -0.006 
Parental Score*Cohort:1963-68                              -0.016                       -0.003 
Parental Score*Cohort:1969-75                              -0.008  0.017 
            
Educ:1a*Cohort:1938-44            0.000 
Educ:1a*Cohort:1945-50            0.000 
Educ:1a*Cohort:1951-56            0.000 
Educ:1a*Cohort:1957-62            0.000 
Educ:1a*Cohort:1963-68            0.000 
Educ:1a*Cohort:1969-75            0.000 
Educ:1b*Cohort:1938-44            0.000 
Educ:1b*Cohort:1945-50                                 -0.009 
Educ:1b*Cohort:1951-56                                 -0.024 
Educ:1b*Cohort:1957-62            0.001 
Educ:1b*Cohort:1963-68            0.034 
Educ:1b*Cohort:1969-75                                 -0.087 
Educ:1c*Cohort:1938-44            0.000 
Educ:1c*Cohort:1945-50            0.038 
Educ:1c*Cohort:1951-56            0.006 
Educ:1c*Cohort:1957-62                                 -0.050 
Educ:1c*Cohort:1963-68                                 -0.071 *
Educ:1c*Cohort:1969-75                                 -0.181 ***
Educ:2a*Cohort:1938-44            0.000 
Educ:2a*Cohort:1945-50                                 -0.038 
Educ:2a*Cohort:1951-56                                 -0.051 
Educ:2a*Cohort:1957-62                                 -0.120 **
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Educ:2a*Cohort:1963-68                                 -0.208 ***
Educ:2a*Cohort:1969-75                                 -0.353 ***
Educ:2b*Cohort:1938-44            0.000 
Educ:2b*Cohort:1945-50                                 -0.019 
Educ:2b*Cohort:1951-56                                 -0.105 **
Educ:2b*Cohort:1957-62                                 -0.252 ***
Educ:2b*Cohort:1963-68                                 -0.273 ***
Educ:2b*Cohort:1969-75                                 -0.370 ***
Educ:2c_gen*Cohort:1938-44           0.000 
Educ:2c_gen*Cohort:1945-50           0.010 
Educ:2c_gen*Cohort:1951-56                                -0.126 **
Educ:2c_gen*Cohort:1957-62                                -0.144 ***
Educ:2c_gen*Cohort:1963-68                                -0.194 ***
Educ:2c_gen*Cohort:1969-75                                -0.451 ***
Educ:2c_voc*Cohort:1938-44           0.000 
Educ:2c_voc*Cohort:1945-50           0.057 
Educ:2c_voc*Cohort:1951-56           0.122 
Educ:2c_voc*Cohort:1957-62           0.061 
Educ:2c_voc*Cohort:1963-68                                -0.034 
Educ:2c_voc*Cohort:1969-75                                -0.251 ***
Educ:3a*Cohort:1938-44            0.000 
Educ:3a*Cohort:1945-50            0.009 
Educ:3a*Cohort:1951-56                                 -0.030 
Educ:3a*Cohort:1957-62                                 -0.023 
Educ:3a*Cohort:1963-68                                 -0.070 *
Educ:3a*Cohort:1969-75                                 -0.266 ***
Educ:3b*Cohort:1938-44            0.000 
Educ:3b*Cohort:1945-50                                 -0.042 
Educ:3b*Cohort:1951-56                                 -0.046 
Educ:3b*Cohort:1957-62                                 -0.027 
Educ:3b*Cohort:1963-68                                 -0.066 *
Educ:3b*Cohort:1969-75                                 -0.180 ***
N   27540  27540                      27540                      27540                      27540                       27540 
R2      0.095     0.316   0.384   0.387                        0.387   0.398 
AIC   37238  29537                      26661                      26572                      26577                       26164 
BIC   37296  29661                      26875                      26851                      26898                       26813 
 
Men and women born in metropolitan France aged 28 to 65 in 2003.
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
In comparison to first job in the service class:
In model 2, both the cohort effect and the parental score effect are more pronounced; the magnitude of the education effect is about the same with a few differences for some 
peculiar diplomas.
In model 4 onwards the structural interaction between parental score and education is very marked (the origin effect totally disappears for those in 3a and 3b). In model 5 onwards 
there is no significant change in the origin effect across cohorts. In model 6, the p-value associated with the 0.017 coefficient is .155.
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Prestige Score of Current Job at the Time of the Survey - Unstandardized Coefficients
      (1)     (2)     (3)     (4)     (5)     (6) 
Intercept                        -0.986 ***                       -2.190 ***                       -2.056 ***                       -2.022 ***                       -2.021 ***                       -2.190 ***
Year:1977   0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Year:1985   0.089 ***  0.002  0.006  0.006  0.003  0.038 *
Year:1993   0.109 ***                       -0.082 ***                       -0.058 ***                       -0.060 ***                       -0.064 ***  0.108 ***
Year:2003   0.128 ***                       -0.196 ***                       -0.154 ***                       -0.157 ***                       -0.160 ***  0.106 ***
            
Age   0.042 ***  0.065 ***  0.059 ***  0.060 ***  0.060 ***  0.062 ***
Age² (× 10³)                        -0.439 ***                       -0.590 ***                       -0.542 ***                       -0.548 ***                       -0.548 ***                       -0.569 ***
            
Parental Score  0.411 ***  0.134 ***  0.100 ***  0.191 ***  0.200 ***  0.166 ***
Educ:1a     0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Educ:1b     0.216 ***  0.205 ***  0.177 ***  0.177 ***  0.279 ***
Educ:1c     0.460 ***  0.401 ***  0.353 ***  0.353 ***  0.492 ***
Educ:2a     0.695 ***  0.663 ***  0.615 ***  0.615 ***  0.940 ***
Educ:2b     0.765 ***  0.758 ***  0.711 ***  0.712 ***  0.923 ***
Educ:2c_gen    1.221 ***  1.226 ***  1.198 ***  1.198 ***  1.495 ***
Educ:2c_voc     0.991 ***  0.957 ***  0.912 ***  0.912 ***  1.287 ***
Educ:3a     1.462 ***  1.458 ***  1.448 ***  1.448 ***  1.652 ***
Educ:3b     1.860 ***  1.796 ***  1.793 ***  1.793 ***  1.882 ***
            
Status:Other      0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Status:Self-employed      0.277 ***  0.276 ***  0.276 ***  0.283 ***
EmplTime:Full Time      0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
EmplTime:Part Time                           -0.161 ***                       -0.159 ***                       -0.160 ***                       -0.157 ***
EmplTime:Unemployed                           -0.221 ***                       -0.217 ***                       -0.218 ***                       -0.220 ***
Sex:Male       0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Sex:Female                            -0.207 ***                       -0.207 ***                       -0.207 ***                       -0.207 ***
Citizen:Native Born      0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Citizen:Naturalized                           -0.003  0.000  0.001  0.009 
Citizen:Foreigner                           -0.287 ***                       -0.271 ***                       -0.268 ***                       -0.219 ***
AreaSize:Rural      0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
AreaSize:<10K Inhab      0.069 ***  0.070 ***  0.070 ***  0.066 ***
AreaSize:<50K      0.112 ***  0.112 ***  0.113 ***  0.105 ***
AreaSize:<200K      0.119 ***  0.120 ***  0.120 ***  0.111 ***
AreaSize:<2M      0.155 ***  0.158 ***  0.158 ***  0.149 ***
AreaSize:Paris      0.284 ***  0.290 ***  0.290 ***  0.280 ***
Parental Score*Educ:1a        0.000  0.000  0.000 
Parental Score*Educ:1b                             -0.044 **                       -0.045 **                       -0.027 
Parental Score*Educ:1c                             -0.094 ***                       -0.092 ***                       -0.083 ***
Parental Score*Educ:2a                             -0.108 ***                       -0.106 ***                       -0.115 ***
Parental Score*Educ:2b                             -0.074 ***                       -0.073 ***                       -0.069 ***
Parental Score*Educ:2c_gen                            -0.150 ***                       -0.148 ***                       -0.145 ***
Parental Score*Educ:2c_voc                            -0.121 ***                       -0.120 ***                       -0.126 ***
Parental Score*Educ:3a                             -0.191 ***                       -0.189 ***                       -0.189 ***
Parental Score*Educ:3b                             -0.149 ***                       -0.147 ***                       -0.146 ***
            
Parental Score*Year:1977         0.000  0.000 
Parental Score*Year:1985                              -0.010  0.003 
Parental Score*Year:1993                              -0.023 *  0.013 
Parental Score*Year:2003                              -0.005  0.046 ***
            
Educ:1a*Year:1977            0.000 
Educ:1a*Year:1985            0.000 
Educ:1a*Year:1993            0.000 
Educ:1a*Year:2003            0.000 
Educ:1b*Year:1977            0.000 
Educ:1b*Year:1985                                 -0.024 
Educ:1b*Year:1993                                 -0.181 ***
Educ:1b*Year:2003                                 -0.154 ***
Educ:1c*Year:1977            0.000 
Educ:1c*Year:1985                                 -0.058 **
Educ:1c*Year:1993                                 -0.200 ***
Educ:1c*Year:2003                                 -0.285 ***
Educ:2a*Year:1977            0.000 
Educ:2a*Year:1985                                 -0.141 ***
Educ:2a*Year:1993                                 -0.370 ***
Educ:2a*Year:2003                                 -0.567 ***
Educ:2b*Year:1977            0.000 
Educ:2b*Year:1985                                 -0.087 **
Educ:2b*Year:1993                                 -0.268 ***
Educ:2b*Year:2003                                 -0.438 ***
Educ:2c_gen*Year:1977            0.000 
Educ:2c_gen*Year:1985                                 -0.170 ***
Educ:2c_gen*Year:1993                                 -0.384 ***
Educ:2c_gen*Year:2003                                 -0.518 ***
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Educ:2c_voc*Year:1977            0.000 
Educ:2c_voc*Year:1985                                 -0.230 ***
Educ:2c_voc*Year:1993                                 -0.423 ***
Educ:2c_voc*Year:2003                                 -0.553 ***
Educ:3a*Year:1977            0.000 
Educ:3a*Year:1985                                 -0.086 **
Educ:3a*Year:1993                                 -0.264 ***
Educ:3a*Year:2003                                 -0.373 ***
Educ:3b*Year:1977            0.000 
Educ:3b*Year:1985            0.019 
Educ:3b*Year:1993                                 -0.137 ***
Educ:3b*Year:2003                                 -0.233 ***
N   76342  76342  76342  76342  76342  76342 
R2     0.146    0.412    0.455    0.457    0.458    0.462 
AIC                       193868                      165444                      159592                      159296                      159294                      158659 
BIC                       193933                      165582                      159832                      159610                      159636                      159223
 
Economically active men and women born in metropolitan France aged 28 to 65 in 1977, 1985, 1993 and 2003.
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
The parental dominant prestige score is in the interval [-1.52; 2.19].
(Models 2-3) After controlling for education (and possibly some other variables), a substantial effect of parental score remains. Controlling for education, we also see a substantial 
decline of the prestige score over time.
(Model 4) The hypothesis is confirmed: the effect of parental score is weaker, though still visible, amongst the most educated. Indeed, it is nonexistent for those in 3a and small 
for those in 3b.
(Model 5) The hypothesis is not confirmed: the effect of parental score does not significantly vary across surveys except for 1993.
(Model 6) But the returns of education in terms of prestige of the current job have declined over time. When the latter effect is taken into account, the interaction between edu-
cation and parental score is still robust. However, an interaction between parental score and time appears: indeed, ascription has significantly increased in the most recent survey 
(2003).
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Current Job in Service Class (I, II) at the Time of the Survey - Unstandardized Coefficients
      (1)     (2)     (3)     (4)     (5)     (6) 
Intercept                        -0.004                       -0.538 ***                       -0.499 ***                       -0.494 ***                       -0.493 ***                       -0.549 ***
Year:1977   0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Year:1985   0.033 ***  0.000                       -0.001                       -0.001  0.000  0.011 *
Year:1993   0.050 ***                       -0.029 ***                       -0.035 ***                       -0.035 ***                       -0.037 ***  0.025 ***
Year:2003   0.075 ***                       -0.071 ***                       -0.083 ***                       -0.083 ***                       -0.084 ***  0.011 *
            
Age   0.012***   0.025 ***  0.023 ***  0.023 ***  0.023 ***  0.024 ***
Age² (× 10³)                        -0.141***                       -0.230 ***                       -0.203 ***                       -0.205 *** - 0.205 ***                       -0.211 ***
            
Parental Score  0.172 ***  0.036 ***  0.035 ***  0.050 ***  0.051 ***  0.034 ***
Educ:1a     0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Educ:1b     0.028 ***  0.029 ***  0.024 ***  0.024 ***  0.053 ***
Educ:1c     0.083 ***  0.074 ***  0.065 ***  0.065 ***  0.091 ***
Educ:2a     0.198 ***  0.190 ***  0.182 ***  0.182 ***  0.298 ***
Educ:2b     0.286 ***  0.273 ***  0.265 ***  0.265 ***  0.354 ***
Educ:2c_gen    0.569 ***  0.552 ***  0.546 ***  0.546 ***  0.712 ***
Educ:2c_voc     0.343 ***  0.334 ***  0.326 ***  0.326 ***  0.437 ***
Educ:3a     0.699 ***  0.684 ***  0.683 ***  0.683 ***  0.816 ***
Educ:3b     0.844 ***  0.827 ***  0.835 ***  0.835 ***  0.867 ***
Status:Other      0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Status:Self-employed                           -0.146 ***                       -0.146 ***                       -0.146 ***                       -0.142 ***
EmplTime:Full Time      0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
EmplTime:Part Time                           -0.049 ***                       -0.049 ***                       -0.049 ***                       -0.048 ***
EmplTime:Unemployed                           -0.052 ***                       -0.051 ***                       -0.051 ***                       -0.053 ***
Sex:Male       0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Sex:Female                            -0.011 ***                       -0.011 **                       -0.011 **                       -0.011 **
Citizen:Native Born      0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Citizen:Naturalized                           -0.027 *                       -0.026 *                       -0.026 *                       -0.023 *
Citizen:Foreigner                           -0.054 ***                       -0.052 ***                       -0.051 ***                       -0.034 ***
AreaSize:Rural      0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
AreaSize:<10K Inhab      0.013 **  0.014 **  0.013 **  0.012 *
AreaSize:<50K      0.018 ***  0.018 ***  0.018 ***  0.016 **
AreaSize:<200K      0.022 ***  0.022 ***  0.022 ***  0.019 ***
AreaSize:<2M      0.028 ***  0.028 ***  0.028 ***  0.026 ***
AreaSize:Paris      0.074 ***  0.075 ***  0.075 ***  0.072 ***
            
Parental Score*Educ:1a        0.000  0.000  0.000 
Parental Score*Educ:1b                             -0.007                       -0.008  0.000 
Parental Score*Educ:1c                             -0.017 **                       -0.016 **                       -0.013 *
Parental Score*Educ:2a                             -0.018 *                       -0.017                        -0.021 * 
Parental Score*Educ:2b                             -0.003                       -0.002                       -0.002 
Parental Score*Educ:2c_gen                            -0.020                       -0.019                       -0.020 
Parental Score*Educ:2c_voc                            -0.015                       -0.014                       -0.018 
Parental Score*Educ:3a                             -0.034 ***                       -0.033 ***                       -0.035 ***
Parental Score*Educ:3b                             -0.036 ***                       -0.035 ***                       -0.036 ***
            
Parental Score*Year:1977         0.000  0.000 
Parental Score*Year:1985         0.007  0.015 **
Parental Score*Year:1993                              -0.013 *  0.007 
Parental Score*Year:2003                              -0.000  0.027 ***
            
Educ:1a*Year:1977            0.000 
Educ:1a*Year:1985            0.000 
Educ:1a*Year:1993            0.000 
Educ:1a*Year:2003            0.000 
Educ:1b*Year:1977            0.000 
Educ:1b*Year:1985            0.005 
Educ:1b*Year:1993                                 -0.047 ***
Educ:1b*Year:2003                                 -0.047 ***
Educ:1c*year:1977            0.000 
Educ:1c*year:1985                                 -0.002 
Educ:1c*year:1993                                 -0.038 ***
Educ:1c*year:2003                                 -0.067 ***
Educ:2a*year:1977            0.000 
Educ:2a*year:1985                                 -0.052 **
Educ:2a*year:1993                                 -0.148 ***
Educ:2a*year:2003                                 -0.190 ***
Educ:2b*year:1977            0.000 
Educ:2b*year:1985                                 -0.048 **
Educ:2b*year:1993                                 -0.117 ***
Educ:2b*year:2003                                 -0.166 ***
Educ:2c_gen*Year:1977            0.000 
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Educ:2c_gen*Year:1985                                                      -0.104 ***
Educ:2c_gen*Year:1993                                                      -0.223 ***
Educ:2c_gen*Year:2003                                                       -0.258 ***
Educ:2c_voc*Year:1977            0.000 
Educ:2c_voc*Year:1985                                                       -0.081 *
Educ:2c_voc*Year:1993                                                       -0.146 ***
Educ:2c_voc*Year:2003                                                       -0.161 ***
Educ:3a*Year:1977            0.000 
Educ:3a*Year:1985                                 -0.060 **
Educ:3a*Year:1993                                 -0.155 ***
Educ:3a*Year:2003                                 -0.217 ***
Educ:3b*Year:1977            0.000 
Educ:3b*Year:1985            0.006 
Educ:3b*Year:1993                                 -0.040 *
Educ:3b*Year:2003                                 -0.088 ***
N   76342  76342  76342  76342  76342  76342 
R2     0.118    0.407    0.426    0.426    0.427    0.430 
AIC   82083  51811  49304  49260  49240  48784 
BIC   82148  51950  49544  49574  49582  49348
 
Economically active men and women born in metropolitan France aged 28 to 65 in 1977, 1985, 1993 and 2003.
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Overall, the results are the same.
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Current Job Outside of Working Class (IIIb, VI, VIIab) at the Time of the Survey - Unstandardized Coefficients
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Intercept   0.332 ***                       -0.205 ***                       -0.126 **                       -0.100 *                       -0.106 **                       -0.167 ***
Year:1977   0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Year:1985   0.032 ***                       -0.011 *                       -0.016 ***                       -0.017 ***                       -0.016 ***                       -0.014 
Year:1993   0.024 ***                       -0.065 ***                       -0.065 ***                       -0.066 ***                       -0.064 ***                       -0.011 
Year:2003   0.010 *                       -0.139 ***                       -0.136 ***                       -0.139 ***                       -0.136 ***                       -0.062 ***
            
Age   0.011 ***  0.020 ***  0.017 ***  0.018 ***  0.018 ***  0.019 ***
Age² (× 10³)                        -0.090 ***                       -0.141 ***                       -0.114 ***                       -0.120 ***                       -0.121 ***                       -0.132 ***
            
Parental Score  0.173 ***  0.067 ***  0.064 ***  0.137 ***  0.129 ***  0.127 ***
            
Educ:1a     0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Educ:1b     0.159 ***  0.142 ***  0.122 ***  0.123 ***  0.162 ***
Educ:1c     0.233 ***  0.217 ***  0.186 ***  0.187 ***  0.236 ***
Educ:2a     0.437 ***  0.413 ***  0.375 ***  0.376 ***  0.487 ***
Educ:2b     0.468 ***  0.444 ***  0.406 ***  0.407 ***  0.486 ***
Educ:2c_gen    0.596 ***  0.567 ***  0.547 ***  0.547 ***  0.571 ***
Educ:2c_voc     0.582 ***  0.557 ***  0.521 ***  0.521 ***  0.594 ***
Educ:3a     0.675 ***  0.646 ***  0.632 ***  0.632 ***  0.615 ***
Educ:3b     0.653 ***  0.627 ***  0.637 ***  0.637 ***  0.621 ***
            
EmplTime:Full Time      0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
EmplTime:Part Time                                                -0.101 ***                       -0.099 ***                       -0.099 ***                       -0.098 ***
EmplTime:Unemployed                          -0.156 ***                       -0.153 ***                       -0.152 ***                       -0.152 ***
Sex:Male       0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Sex:Female       0.059 ***  0.058 ***  0.058 ***  0.057 ***
Citizen:Native Born      0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Citizen:Naturalized                           -0.040 *                       -0.037 *                       -0.038 *                       -0.037 *
Citizen:Foreigner                           -0.274 ***                       -0.261 ***                       -0.263 ***                       -0.249 ***
AreaSize:Rural      0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
AreaSize:<10K Inhab                           -0.034 ***                       -0.033 ***                       -0.033 ***                       -0.034 ***
AreaSize:<50K                           -0.025 ***                       -0.024 ***                       -0.023 ***                       -0.026 ***
AreaSize:<200K                           -0.035 ***                       -0.034 ***                       -0.033 ***                       -0.036 ***
AreaSize:<2M                           -0.012 *                       -0.009                       -0.009                       -0.012 *
AreaSize:Paris      0.045 ***  0.050 ***  0.051 ***  0.047 ***
Parental Score*Educ:1a        0.000  0.000  0.000 
Parental Score*Educ:1b                             -0.031 ***                       -0.028 **                       -0.026 **
Parental Score*Educ:1c                             -0.054 ***                       -0.053 ***                       -0.051 ***
Parental Score*Educ:2a                             -0.081 ***                       -0.085 ***                       -0.086 ***
Parental Score*Educ:2b                             -0.089 ***                       -0.090 ***                       -0.088 ***
Parental Score*Educ:2c_gen                            -0.129 ***                       -0.131 ***                       -0.127 ***
Parental Score*Educ:2c_voc                            -0.111 ***                       -0.118 ***                       -0.113 ***
Parental Score*Educ:3a                             -0.137 ***                       -0.141 ***                       -0.136 ***
Parental Score*Educ:3b                             -0.136 ***                       -0.140 ***                       -0.134 ***
            
Parental Score*Year:1977         0.000  0.000 
Parental Score*Year:1985                              -0.001  0.002 
Parental Score*Year:1993         0.008  0.009 
Parental Score*Year:2003         0.023 ***  0.017 **
            
Educ:1a*Year:1977            0.000 
Educ:1a*Year:1985            0.000 
Educ:1a*Year:1993            0.000 
Educ:1a*Year:2003            0.000 
Educ:1b*Year:1977            0.000 
Educ:1b*Year:1985            0.001 
Educ:1b*Year:1993                                 -0.088 ***
Educ:1b*Year:2003                                 -0.090 ***
Educ:1c*Year:1977            0.000 
Educ:1c*Year:1985                                 -0.012 
Educ:1c*Year:1993                                 -0.065 **
Educ:1c*Year:2003                                 -0.116 ***
Educ:2a*Year:1977            0.000 
Educ:2a*Year:1985                                 -0.030 
Educ:2a*Year:1993                                 -0.126 ***
Educ:2a*Year:2003                                 -0.196 ***
Educ:2b*Year:1977            0.000 
Educ:2b*Year:1985                                 -0.018 
Educ:2b*Year:1993                                 -0.105 ***
Educ:2b*Year:2003                                 -0.169 ***
Educ:2c_gen*Year:1977            0.000 
Educ:2c_gen*Year:1985                                 -0.001 
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Educ:2c_gen*Year:1993                                 -0.040 
Educ:2c_gen*Year:2003                                 -0.058 ***
Educ:2c_voc*Year:1977            0.000 
Educ:2c_voc*Year:1985                                 -0.008 
Educ:2c_voc*Year:1993                                 -0.057 *
Educ:2c_voc*Year:2003                                 -0.140 ***
Educ:3a*Year:1977                                  0.000 
Educ:3a*Year:1985                                  0.010 
Educ:3a*Year:1993                                 -0.009 
Educ:3a*Year:2003            0.006 
Educ:3b*Year:1977            0.000 
Educ:3b*Year:1985            0.005 
Educ:3b*Year:1993                                 -0.019 
Educ:3b*Year:2003            0.016 
N   76342  76342  76342  76342  76342  76342 
R2     0.093    0.264    0.281    0.287    0.287    0.290 
AIC   99097  83090  81379  80791  80768  80459 
BIC   99161  83228  81610  81096  81101  81014 
Economically active men and women born in metropolitan France aged 28 to 65 in 1977, 1985, 1993 and 2003.
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Up to model 5, the results are the same as for current job in the service class. Regarding model 6, it is remarkable that educational levels 3a and 3b effectively still protect from 
belonging to the working class; simultaneously, we still observe a slightly increasing ascriptive effect in the last survey (2003).
 
30 Notes & Documents de l’OSC n° 2016-5 Bouchet-Valat, Peugny, Vallet
Log Wage of Current Job - Unstandardized Coefficients
      (1)     (2)     (3)     (4)     (5)     (6) 
Intercept   8.661 ***  8.113 ***  8.185 ***  8.202 ***  8.205 ***  8.104 ***
Year:1977   0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Year:1985   0.046 ***  0.004  0.006  0.005                       -0.001  0.058 ***
Year:1993   0.040 ***                       -0.046 ***                       -0.040 ***                       -0.042 ***                       -0.045 ***  0.074 ***
Year:2003   0.034 ***                       -0.102 ***                       -0.098 ***                       -0.099 ***                       -0.104 ***  0.023 
           
Age   0.058 ***  0.069 ***  0.067 ***  0.068 ***  0.068 ***  0.069 ***
Age² (× 10³)                                              -0.585 ***                       -0.670 ***                       -0.651 ***                       -0.651 ***                       -0.652 ***                       -0.662 ***
            
Parental Score  0.168 ***  0.062 ***  0.046 ***  0.081 ***  0.094 ***  0.073 ***
Educ:1a     0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Educ:1b     0.094 ***  0.110 ***  0.092 ***  0.091 ***  0.155 ***
Educ:1c     0.238 ***  0.214 ***  0.194 ***  0.195 ***  0.284 ***
Educ:2a     0.343 ***  0.360 ***  0.343 ***  0.343 ***  0.503 ***
Educ:2b     0.341 ***  0.374 ***  0.355 ***  0.355 ***  0.459 ***
Educ:2c_gen    0.457 ***  0.510 ***  0.497 ***  0.497 ***  0.624 ***
Educ:2c_voc     0.423 ***  0.441 ***  0.424 ***  0.424 ***  0.630 ***
Educ:3a     0.539 ***  0.587 ***  0.578 ***  0.578 ***  0.634 ***
Educ:3b     0.806 ***  0.806 ***  0.784 ***  0.784 ***  0.924 ***
            
Sex:Male       0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Sex:Female                                                                       -0.298 ***                       -0.298 ***                       -0.298 ***                       -0.298 ***
Citizen:Native Born      0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Citizen:Naturalized                           -0.011                       -0.011                       -0.009                       -0.004 
Citizen:Foreigner                           -0.101 ***                       -0.096 ***                       -0.091 ***                       -0.062 ***
AreaSize:Rural      0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
AreaSize:<10K Inhab      0.029 ***  0.029 ***  0.029 ***  0.028 ***
AreaSize:<50K      0.048 ***  0.049 ***  0.049 ***  0.046 ***
AreaSize:<200K      0.046 ***  0.047 ***  0.047 ***  0.044 ***
AreaSize:<2M      0.057 ***  0.057 ***  0.058 ***  0.054 ***
AreaSize:Paris      0.194 ***  0.195 ***  0.195 ***  0.191 ***
            
Parental Score*Educ:1a        0.000  0.000  0.000 
Parental Score*Educ:1b                             -0.034 **                       -0.035 ***                       -0.027 *
Parental Score*Educ:1c                             -0.039 ***                       -0.037 ***                       -0.033 **
Parental Score*Educ:2a                             -0.029 *                       -0.027 *                       -0.027 *
Parental Score*Educ:2b                             -0.037 **                       -0.035 **                       -0.031 **
Parental Score*Educ:2c_gen                            -0.057 ***                       -0.055 ***                       -0.053 ***
Parental Score*Educ:2c_voc                            -0.072 ***                       -0.069 ***                       -0.068 ***
Parental Score*Educ:3a                             -0.065 ***                       -0.063 ***                       -0.060 ***
Parental Score*Educ:3b                             -0.031 *                       -0.029 *                       -0.025 *
            
Parental Score*Year:1977         0.000  0.000 
Parental Score*Year:1985                              -0.028 ***                       -0.006 
Parental Score*Year:1993                              -0.012  0.014 
Parental Score*Year:2003                              -0.018 *  0.000 
            
Educ:1a*Year:1977            0.000 
Educ:1a*Year:1985            0.000 
Educ:1a*Year:1993            0.000 
Educ:1a*Year:2003            0.000 
Educ:1b*Year:1977            0.000 
Educ:1b*Year:1985                                 -0.028 *
Educ:1b*Year:1993                                 -0.116 ***
Educ:1b*Year:2003                                 -0.140 ***
Educ:1c*Year:1977            0.000 
Educ:1c*Year:1985                                 -0.078 ***
Educ:1c*Year:1993                                 -0.127 ***
Educ:1c*Year:2003                                 -0.158 ***
Educ:2a*Year:1977            0.000 
Educ:2a*Year:1985                                 -0.129 ***
Educ:2a*Year:1993                                 -0.193 ***
Educ:2a*Year:2003                                 -0.252 ***
Educ:2b*Year:1977            0.000 
Educ:2b*Year:1985                                 -0.079 ***
Educ:2b*Year:1993                                 -0.167 ***
Educ:2b*Year:2003                                 -0.170 ***
Educ:2c_gen*Year:1977            0.000 
Educ:2c_gen*Year:1985                                 -0.109 ***
Educ:2c_gen*Year:1993                                 -0.213 ***
Educ:2c_gen*Year:2003                                 -0.167 ***
Educ:2c_voc*Year:1977            0.000 
Educ:2c_voc*Year:1985                                 -0.132 ***
Educ:2c_voc*Year:1993                                 -0.263 ***
Educ:2c_voc*Year:2003                                 -0.277 ***
31Inequality of Educational Returns in France
Educ:3a*Year:1977            0.000 
Educ:3a*Year:1985                                 -0.097 ***
Educ:3a*Year:1993                                 -0.112 ***
Educ:3a*Year:2003                                 -0.071 **
Educ:3b*Year:1977            0.000 
Educ:3b*Year:1985                                 -0.145 ***
Educ:3b*Year:1993                                 -0.199 ***
Educ:3b*Year:2003                                 -0.196 ***
N   50413  50413  50413  50413  50413                        50413 
R2     0.097    0.243    0.327    0.328    0.328    0.332 
AIC   73071  64197  58302  58255  58243  58020 
BIC   73133  64329  58505  58528  58543  58532 
Men and women born in Metropolitan France aged 28 to 65 in 1977, 1985, 1993 and 2003 who worked full time during 12 months the year before the survey.
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
The parental dominant prestige score is in the interval [-1.52; 2.19].
(Models 2-3) After controlling for education (and possibly some other variables), a substantial effect of parental score remains.
(Model 4) The hypothesis is partly confirmed: generally speaking, the effect of parental score is weaker, though still visible, amongst those who are more educated; however, it is 
remarkable that the effect of parental score is indeed larger for the most educated (3b) than for those immediately below (3a, 2c_voc, 2c_gen).
(Model 5) The hypothesis is not substantially confirmed: the effect of parental score does not strongly vary across surveys.
(Model 6) The returns of education in terms of income provided by the current job have declined over time. When the latter effect is taken into account, the interaction between 
education and parental score is still robust and the interesting curvilinearity described above is still visible. Finally, there is strong confirmation that the effect of parental score on 
income (log wage) has not changed at all over time.
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Abstract 
This paper is an extended version of the chapter about France within the comparative volume edited by F. Bernardi and G. 
Ballarino (2016), Education, Occupation and Social Origin. A Comparative Analysis of the Transmission of Socio-Economic Ine-
qualities, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar Publishing. On the basis of the 1977, 1985, 1993 and 2003 Formation & Qualification Pro-
fessionnelle surveys and various indicators of labour market success, it establishes three main results: (1) after controlling for 
education, there still exists a ‘direct’ effect of class origin on labour market success which is visible more at an advanced stage of 
the occupational career than at its outset; (2) this ‘direct’ origin effect varies in strength over educational categories, being wea-
ker or non-existent among the higher-educated, i.e., a higher social background is to a certain extent able to compensate for less 
prominent educational assets; (3) the ‘direct’ origin effect has strengthened in the recent cohorts or the last decade observed. 
Keywords
social origin, education, labour market success, direct effect of social origin
Résumé
Cette note est une version longue du chapitre à propos de la France, publié au sein du volume comparatif dirigé par F. Bernardi 
et G. Ballarino (2016), Education, Occupation and Social Origin. A Comparative Analysis of the Transmission of Socio-Econo-
mic Inequalities, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar Publishing. À partir des enquêtes Formation & Qualification Professionnelle de 
1977, 1985, 1993 et 2003 ainsi que de plusieurs indicateurs du degré de réussite professionnelle, elle établit les trois résultats 
suivants : (1) à niveau d’éducation contrôlé, il existe encore un effet ‘direct’ de l’origine sociale sur la réussite professionnelle 
et cet effet est davantage visible à un stade avancé de la carrière qu’au début ; (2) cet effet ‘direct’ de l’origine sociale varie, 
dans son intensité, avec le niveau d’éducation et s’avère plus faible, voire inexistant, parmi les diplômés de l’enseignement 
supérieur - en d’autres termes, une origine sociale plus élevée est susceptible de compenser, jusqu’à un certain degré, des 
ressources scolaires plus faibles ; (3) l’effet ‘direct’ de l’origine sociale s’est renforcé dans les cohortes récentes ou la dernière 
décennie observée.
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